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Abstract  
In the given research we study a leadership formation of the most influential nodes in networks. 
Specifically, we analyze the competition between a leader and a follower based on the 
Stackelberg leadership model. Applying the concept of Shapley value to measure node’s 
importance, we represent the mechanism of Shapley-based Stackelberg leadership formation 
in networks. The approach is tested and represented in tabular and graphical formats. 
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1. INTRODUCTIONi 
 
The investigation of competition between network’s leaders is at the core of the leadership 
formation analysis in social networks. The problem is closely correlated with the centrality 
measurement that is based on the different evaluation methods. Degree (Freeman, 1979), 
betweenness (Anthonisse, 1971; Freeman, 1977), and closeness (Beauchamp, 1965; Sabidussi, 
1966) are the most widely known metrics that assess the structural centralities of nodes. The 
algorithmic measures of node’s authority are well represented in Kleinberg (1999) and Page, 
Brin, Motwani, & Winograd (1999), where the notion of authority is given based on the analysis 
of link structures. An interesting approach to characterize the role of nodes within the networks 
is given by Scripps & Esfahanian (2007), where the community-based metric in the symbiosis 
with the degree-based measure is introduced in the context of the classification of nodes’ roles. 
Another methodology for analyzing node’s leadership and importance in networks is based on 
a game theoretic approach. Specifically, we employ the Shapley value concept developed by 
Aadithya, Ravindran, Michalak, & Jennings (2010) in order to analyze how the nodes’ 
leadership positions in networks can be strengthened by establishing new links. 
In the given research, we analyze the leadership formation in terms of the competition between 
the most influential leader and its follower in a network. We interpret the interaction between 
the leader and the follower in social networks based on the Stackelberg competition principle 
(Von Stackelberg, 2010) from the game theoretic domain. More details about the Stackelberg 
model can be found in Simaan, & Cruz (1973), Basar, Olsder, Clsder, Basar, Baser, & Olsder 
(1995), and He, Prasad, Sethi, & Gutierrez (2007). 
Applying Shapley value to measure an agent’s (i.e., nodes) leadership position in a network, 
we represent the mechanism of the Shapley-based Stackelberg leadership formation. It reflects 
the competition between the most influential agent (i.e., leader) and the second most influence 
agent (i.e., follower) in the network. 
 
                                                          
i The section uses partly or exclusively text and data from Belik, I., & Jornsten, K. (2015) 
2. SHAPLEY VALUE AS AN AGENT’S IMPORTANCE MEASUREii 
 
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1952) is a game theoretic approach that provides the solution for 
computing of players’ gains in cooperative games where the players’ contributions are non-
equal. The formal definition of the Shapley value (SV) is well-described in Littlechild & Owen 
(1973) and Gul (1989). Specifically, the SV equation for the player i in the coalition game with 
n players is the following: 
𝑆𝑉𝑖(𝑣) = ∑
|𝑆|!(𝑛−|𝑆|−1)!
𝑛!𝑆⊆𝑁\{𝑖}
(𝑣(𝑆 ∪ {𝑖}) − 𝑣(𝑆)),                                (1) 
where: 
N is a set of n players; 
S is a coalition of players; 
 𝑣 is the characteristic function: 2𝑁 → ℝ; 𝑣(Ø) = 0. 
 
The Shapley value is characterized by different properties such as efficiency, symmetry, 
linearity etc. (Hart, 1989). 
The special interest for employing the SV approach in the area of socio-economic network 
analysis is based on its use to measure the importance of nodes. In other words, SV is interpreted 
as the level of the nodes’ importance within a network (Suri & Narahari, 2008; Gomez, 
González-Arangüena, Manuel, Owen, del Pozo, & Tejada, 2003). 
We employ the computational approach of the Shapley value as a centrality measure in 
networks that was developed by Aadithya et al. (2010). They introduced the idea of Shapley 
value “in the domain of networks, where it is used to measure the importance of individual 
nodes, which is known as game theoretic network centrality” (Aadithya et al., 2010). 
Consider graph G(V,E) and 𝑣𝑖 ∈ V. All nodes (i.e., neighbors), which are reachable from 𝑣𝑖 at 
most one hop within G(V,E) are denoted by 𝑁𝐺(𝑣𝑖). The degree of node 𝑣𝑖 is defined by 
𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑣𝑖). The SV interpretation for node 𝑣𝑖 in G(V,E), according to Aadithya et al. (2010), is 
the following: 
𝑆𝑉(𝑣𝑖) = ∑
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑣𝑗)
,𝑣𝑗∈{𝑣𝑖}∪𝑁𝐺(𝑣𝑖)                                                         (2) 
Based on equation (2) Aadithya et al. (2010) introduced an algorithm to calculate SVs for all 
nodes in the network: 
SV-COMPUTING: 
Input: Unweighted graph G(V,E) 
Output: SVs of all nodes in V(G) 
for each v ∈ V(G) do 
 ShapleyValue [v]= 
1
1+degG(v)
; 
 For each u ∈ NG(v) do 
  ShapleyValue [v] += 
1
1+degG(u)
; 
  
end 
 
end 
return ShapleyValue; 
                                                          
ii The section uses partly or exclusively text and data from Belik, I., & Jornsten, K. (2015) 
The advantage of the given algorithm is the polynomial running time O(V+E) (Cormen, 
Leiserson, Rivest, & Stein, 2003) to compute SVs for all nodes in G(V,E) based on equation 
(2). 
To illustrate how the algorithm works we consider the trivial example (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Example network for SVs computation 
 
We calculate SVs for three nodes following the algorithm: 
I. For node 1: 
 1) SV′(𝑣1) =
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑣1)
=
1
1+1
=
1
2
 
 2) 𝑢 ∈ 𝑁𝐺(𝑣1): 𝑢 ∈ {"𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 3"}: 
 SV(𝑣1) = SV′(𝑣1) +
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺("𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 3")
=
1
2
+
1
1+2
=
5
6
 
Thus, SV(𝑣1) =
5
6
 
 
II. For node 2: 
1) SV′(𝑣2) =
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑣2)
=
1
1+1
=
1
2
 
 2) 𝑢 ∈ 𝑁𝐺(𝑣2): 𝑢 ∈ {"𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 3"}: 
 SV(𝑣2) = SV′(𝑣2) +
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺("𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 3")
=
1
2
+
1
1+2
=
5
6
 
Thus, SV(𝑣2) =
5
6
 
 
III. For node 3: 
1) SV′(𝑣3) =
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑣3)
=
1
1+2
=
1
3
 
 2) 𝑢 ∈ 𝑁𝐺(𝑣3): 𝑢 ∈ {node 1, "𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 2"}: 
 SV(𝑣3) = SV
′(𝑣3) +
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(node 1)
+
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(node 2)
=
1
2
+
1
1+1
+
1
1+1
=
4
3
 
Thus, SV(𝑣3) =
4
3
 
 
Obviously, node 3 has the highest SV, and nodes 1 and 2 have equal SVs. The given results 
satisfy the efficiency requirement (Hart, 1989). 
 
3. STACKELBERG LEADERSHIP FORMATION BASED ON SHAPLEY VALUE 
 
In terms of networks, we consider Shapley-based Stackelberg competition as the strategic 
competition between two most powerful agents (i.e., nodes). Accordingly, leader is a node with 
the first largest Shapley value, and follower is a node with the second largest Shapley value. 
First step, we detect the leader and the follower in the network G, following the initialization 
procedure: 
 
INITIALIZATION (G): 
1 SV-COMPUTING (G); 
2 NODES-SORTING (G); 
3 Leader = first largest in SL; 
4 Follower = second largest in SL; 
  
Notation: 
SV-COMPUTING (G): calculating SVs for all nodes in network G based on the algorithm represented in 
Section 2. 
NODES-SORTING (G): 
For graph G(V,E) we have SVs for all n=|G.V| nodes based on the SV-COMPUTING (G) results. Applying 
one of the sorting algorithms, such as Quick Sort, Heap Sort or Merge Sort (Cormen et al., 2003), we sort 
all nodes in descending order based on the corresponding SVs. NODES-SORTING(G) returns the sorted 
list of nodes (SL), where SL[1] is the node with the max SV-value, and SL[n] is the node with the min 
SV-value. 
 
Based on the INITIALIZATION-procedure we have a list of nodes sorted by SV values, detected 
leader and follower, and their initial SVs, i.e., SVinitial(Leader) and SVinitial(Follower). 
Shapley-based Stackelberg competition starts with the leader’s first move based on the 
LEADERSHIP (x) – procedure represented below. When the LEADERSHIP (x) – procedure is 
completed for the leader, then the follower acts following the LEADERSHIP (x) – procedure. 
Therefore, leader and follower act sequentially, following the LEADERSHIP (x) – procedure on 
each step, where x is a currently acting agent (i.e., the leader or the follower). 
 
LEADERSHIP (x): 
1 k = 1; 
2 FOR i = k to n in SL: 
3           IF [edge (x, SL[i]) does not exist in G] AND [x ≠ SL[i]]: 
4           THEN: previous_SV(i) = SV(i); 
5          previous_SV(x) = SV(x); 
6          Establish test-edge (x, SL[i]); 
7          SV-COMPUTING (G); 
8          IF [previous_SV(i) < SV(i) AND previous_SV(x) < SV(x)]: 
9          THEN: approve edge (x, SL[i]); 
10         Return: stop & save SV(x);  
11          ELSE: Erase edge (x, SL[i]); 
12       Roll back to SV- and SL-results that exclude edge (x, SL[i]); 
13       k = k + 1; 
14           ELSE: k = k + 1; 
15 return: save SV(x)  
 
Shapley-based Stackelberg competition stops in one of two cases: 
 
1) One of the agents (i.e., leader or follower) cannot improve its SV value. It means that on 
one of the iterations of the Shapley-based Stackelberg competition, the agent checked all 
possible links, but none of them was approved. 
2) Node’s degree (i.e., agent’s number of links) achieves the value of (n-1). 
 
When the Shapley-based Stackelberg competition is finished, we get the final SVs for the leader 
and for the follower, i.e. SVfinal(Leader) and SVfinal(Follower). 
 
 
 
Shapley-based Stackelberg leadership equilibrium in networks: 
The competing agents (i.e., the leader and the follower) are in the state of Shapley-based 
Stackelberg leadership equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
1) SVfinal(Leader) − SVinitial(Leader) is positive. 
2) SVfinal(Follower) − SVinitial(Follower) is positive. 
 
4. TESTING ON NETWORKS 
 
We show Shapley-based Stackelberg leadership formation based on two networks. First, we 
employ the network with a symmetric mixed topology. It combines different types of trivial 
topologies, such as “point-to-point”, “star” and “ring”. Second, we show our approach based 
on the real-life network that is represented by the connected network’s component of the 
Department of Economics at NHH (Belik & Jornsten, 2014). 
 
4.1 Symmetric network with mixed topology 
 
The initial structure of the network G with symmetric mixed topology is represented in Figure 
2. Based on the INITIALIZATION (G) – procedure we get two potential leaders (specifically, 
nodes 3 and 5) and four potential followers (specifically, nodes 1, 2, 6, and 7). SV results for 
the initial structure are represented in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Symmetric mixed topology in the initial state 
Table 1. Initial SVs 
node Shapley value 
1 0.92 
2 0.92 
3 1.25 
4 0.83 
5 1.25 
6 0.92 
7 0.92 
 
 
Since nodes SV(“node 3”) = SV(“node 5”), we can assign any of them to be a leader. Similarly, 
we can assign any of the nodes 1, 2, 6 or 7 to be a follower. 
We choose node 3 to be a leader and node 5 to be a follower. 
According to the Shapley-based Stackelberg competition, the leader moves first, following the 
LEADERSHIP (x) – procedure and, accordingly, connecting to node 5. The results are 
represented in Figure 3 and Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 3. First modification of the symmetric mixed topology  
Table 2. SVs after the first modification 
node Shapley value 
1 0.87 
2 0.87 
3 1.40 
4 0.73 
5 1.40 
6 0.87 
7 0.87 
 
 
Link “node 3 – node 5” improves the leadership positions for both nodes: ∆SV(“node 3”) = 
+0.15 and ∆SV(“node 5”) = +0.48. Therefore, link “node 3 – node 5” is approved based on the 
LEADERSHIP (x) – procedure. 
Next, the follower (i.e., node 6) makes its move. Following the LEADERSHIP (x) – procedure, 
it links to node 3. As the result, we get a graph represented in Figure 4 (see Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Second modification of the symmetric mixed 
topology  
Table 3. SVs after the second modification 
node Shapley value 
1 0.83 
2 0.83 
3 1.62 
4 0.70 
5 1.28 
6 0.95 
7 0.78 
 
 
We approve the link “node 6 – node 3”, because the SVs for both nodes have been improved: 
∆SV(“node 6”) = +0.08 and ∆SV(“node 3”) = +0.22. Since the increments are positive, we 
approve the given link. 
Following the Shapley-based Stackelberg competition, the leader connects to node 7. The 
resulting network is represented in Figure 5 and the recalculated SVs are given in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Third modification of the symmetric mixed topology  
Table 4. SVs after the third modification 
node Shapley value 
1 0.81 
2 0.81 
3 1.84 
4 0.68 
5 1.18 
6 0.84 
7 0.84 
 
 
Link “node 3 – node 7” is approved, because the SVs for both nodes have been improved. 
Sequentially, node 6 makes its move connecting to node 1. Based on the LEADERSHIP (x) – 
procedure we get the updated structure (see Figure 6) and the resulting SVs that are represented 
in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Fourth modification of the symmetric mixed topology  
Table 5. SVs after the fourth modification 
node Shapley value 
1 0.93 
2 0.73 
3 1.71 
4 0.68 
5 1.13 
6 1.04 
7 0.79 
 
Link “node 6 – node 1” improves the leadership positions for both nodes: ∆SV(“node 6”) = 
+0.20 and ∆SV(“node 1”) = +0.12. Therefore, we approve link “node 6 – node 1”. 
Next, the leader has to make its move, but its degree (i.e., number of links) is equal to (n-1) in 
the given network. It corresponds to the second case of the Shapley-based Stackelberg 
competition that specifies the stopping procedure. Specifically, no more links can be established 
for the current node. The stop+conditions are described in Section 3. Therefore, the Shapley-
based Stackelberg leadership formation for the current network competition is finished on this 
step  
Finally, we check if the leader and the follower achieved the Shapley-based Stackelberg 
leadership equilibrium: 
 
1) SVfinal(Leader) − SVinitial(Leader) = 1.71 – 1.25 = +0.46 
2) SVfinal(Follower) − SVinitial(Follower) = 1.04 – 0.92 = +0.12 
 
Since both increments are positive, we conclude that the leader and the follower are in the 
Shapley-based Stackelberg leadership equilibrium for the given network. 
 
4.2 Real-life network 
 
We illustrate our approach based on the co-authorship network of the Department of Economics 
at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) (Belik, & Jornsten, 2014). Specifically, we 
analyze the connected component of the departmental graph (see Figure 7). The given network 
is based on the scientific collaboration between the faculty members and their academic 
publication records according to the ISI Web of Science for the period 1950 – Spring, 2014. 
Network’s nodes correspond to the departmental faculty members, and the edges correspond to 
the existing joint publications. The initial SVs calculated for the network are represented in 
Table 6. 
 
Figure 7. Departmental connected component 
 
Table 6. The initial SVs for the departmental connected component 
NODE SV 
 
NODE SV 
node 34 0.82 node 60 0.93 
node 37 0.75 node 61 0.83 
node 39 0.95 node 65 1.13 
node 40 0.64 node 67 0.68 
node 45 1.07 node 69 1.02 
node 50 1.17 node 70 2.09 
node 53 0.81 node 73 1.40 
node 58 0.73   
 
Based on the INITIALIZATION (G) – procedure we detect the leader and the follower that are node 
70 and node 73, respectively. Iteratively running Shapley-based Stackelberg competition based 
on the LEADERSHIP (x) – procedure we get the results represented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. SVs based on the established links in the Shapley-based Stackelberg competition 
 LINK Shapley Value 
Iteration Start node End node 
Start node End node 
before  after before  after 
1 node 70 node 73 2.09 2.22 1.40 1.50 
2 node 73 node 50 1.50 1.73 1.17 1.21 
3 node 70 node 50 2.39 2.20 1.21 1.27 
4 node 73 node 65 1.67 1.82 1.09 1.17 
5 node 70 node 45 2.34 2.49 1.01 1.08 
6 node 73 node 60 1.78 1.97 0.85 0.90 
7 node 70 node 69 2.43 2.59 0.88 0.94 
8 node 73 node 53 1.92 2.17 0.62 0.63 
9 node 70 node 39 2.50 2.69 0.84 0.87 
It is important to notice that during the given Shapley-based Stackelberg competition the link 
“node 15 – node 10” was not approved on iteration 8, because the increment of SV (“node 10”) 
was negative. When link “node 70 – node 39” was established on iteration 9, then node 73 (i.e., 
the follower) did four trials to establish links on iteration 10, but none one of the links were 
approved due to the reasons represented in Table 8: 
 
Table 8. Trials to establish links for the follower on iteration 10 
TRIAL  REASON 
Link «node 15 – node 10»  ∆SV(“node 10”) is negative 
Link «node 15 – node 8»  ∆SV(“node 8”) is equal to zero 
Link «node 15 – node 4»  ∆SV(“node 4”) is negative 
Link «node 15 – node 12»  ∆SV(“node 12”) is equal to zero 
 
Since the follower could not improve its SV value on iteration 10, and, sequentially, no link 
was established, then the Shapley-based Stackelberg competition was finished based on the first 
case of the stop conditions described in Section 3. 
Therefore, on the final ninth iteration of the Shapley-based Stackelberg leadership formation 
we get SVfinal(Leader) = 2.69 and SVfinal(Follower) = 2.11. 
The updated network’s structure is represented in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. The updated structure of the departmental connected component 
Finally, we check if the leader and the follower achieved the Shapley-based Stackelberg 
leadership equilibrium: 
 
3) SVfinal(Leader) − SVinitial(Leader) = 2.69 – 2.09 = +0.60  
4) SVfinal(Follower) − SVinitial(Follower) = 2.11 – 1.40 = +0.71 
 
Since both increments are positive, we conclude that the leader and the follower are in the 
Shapley-based Stackelberg leadership equilibrium for the given network. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Generally, the analysis of leadership formation is an important problem in terms of the strategic 
network formation. It becomes even more important if the most influential agents (i.e., the 
leader and the follower) are competing for the influence within a network. Since they are 
initially the most powerful in a network, the analysis of their actions is critically important in 
terms of understanding the prospective network modifications. 
In the given research, we represented the integrative approach that reflects the mechanism of 
the leadership formation in networks. Specifically, we employ the Shapley value concept to 
measure the influential power of nodes (i.e., agents) and the concept of the Stackelberg 
competition to formalize a leader-follower behavior in networks. The resulting formalization 
of the Shapley-based Stackelberg competition reflects the leadership formation in networks in 
terms of the leader-follower sequential acting. In addition, we provided the interpretation of the 
Shapley-based Stackelberg leadership equilibrium in networks. 
The represented mechanism of the Shapley-based Stackelberg leadership formation is tested 
based on the symmetric network with mixed topology and the real-life network retrieved from 
the NHH co-authorship network. The results are tested and represented in tabular and graphical 
formats. 
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